The Volume of Corporate Bond Financing Since 1900 by W. Braddock Hickman
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Volume of Corporate Bond Financing Since 1900
Volume Author/Editor: W. Braddock Hickman




Chapter Title: OFFERINGS, EXTINGUISHMENTS, AND OUTSTANDINGS
Chapter Author: W. Braddock Hickman
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c3085
Chapter pages in book: (p. 42 - 90)OFFERINGS, EXTINGUISHMENTS, AND
OUTSTANDINGS
AGGREGATE statistics on offerings, extinguishments, and outstand-
ings may be used in several ways. Their most direct use is in the
analysis of the volume of investment instruments available to
investors. If holdings of other-than-household investor groups are
deducted, estimates of the savings held as corporate bond invest-
ments by the household sector may be obtained. Within the non-
financial corporate sector of the economy, the debt series reflect
the ability and willingness of various obligor groups to tap the
market for capital funds, and when related to the series on interest
payments developed in Chapter 6, they provide a basis for
measuring the burden of the funded debt once this market has
been tapped.
From the standpoint of general economic analysis these data
should be particularly useful in studying the interrelationships of
debt formation, asset formation, and the level of economic
activity. Under different hypotheses, debt financing is assumed
to be associated with the tempo of business activity, with interest
rates, and with security prices. In order to test such hypotheses
it is necessary to trace accurately and over a long period the
principal movements occurring in corporate funded debt.
The first section after the chapter summary will deal with
movements in total outstandings of straight bonds and with the
major industrial and size components of the total. Later sections
will trace the movements in offerings, extinguishments, and net
changes in outstandings, and investigate the interrelationships of
the series.
SUMMARY OF
The analysis will clarify certain problems that are encountered in
efforts to control the bond market through monetary measures.
Some credit markets—instalment sales credit is an example—have
been susceptible of monetary control through regulation of the
total volume of new credit granted (analogous to total bond
offerings as defined in our study) because the volume of creditOUTSTAND1NGS 43
repaid is relatively steady. But in the bond field the volume of
refundings and repayments is large and highly variable. Ex-
tremely low interest rates in the thirties, for example, induced a
large volume of refunding activity in the bond market yet had
little influence on the net volume of bond financing. Although
bond offerings reached near-record levels in that period, they
were exceeded by bond extinguishments, with the result that
outstandings turned down. In 1918, on the other hand, bond
offerings were unusually low but extinguishments were even
lower, so that outstandings increased. In short, in the bond
market the total volume of offerings, because it includes refund-
ings, is a poor guide to the net amount of credit originating.
Whether a series covering only offerings for new-money purposes
(offerings excluding refundings) may be a more reliable guide
will be examined in the next chapter.
Here we are able to throw some light on another practical
problem, that which besets the investor in attempting to space his
portfolio so that cash funds will flow in as needed. It is found,
in the first place, that maturity dates are not at all a trustworthy
indication of actual expiration dates; and in the second place,
that the actual repayment of bonds has tended over the business
cycle to coincide with the flow of other funds toward the investor,
while, conversely, the life spans of bonds have tended to lengthen
at a time when the money market was already tight. We also find
a progressive shortening of both the nominal and the actual life
spans of bonds in the period studied.
OUTSTANDINGS
Table A-2 presents dollar figures for outstandings of straight
bonds classified by major industry group, and Chart 2 traces the
annual movements of the series.
As the chart shows, aggregate outstandings of straight bonds
increased continuously from $5.9 billion par amount in 1900 to a
peak of $29.0 billion in 1932, the average annual increment being
$0.7 billion. Except for a single rise in 1938, they then decreased
in every year to $22.8 billion at the beginning of 1944, the average
annual decrement being $0.5 billion. Our special tabulations on
outstandings terminate on the latter date, but rougher estimates
for later years, whose construction will be described in Chapter 6,
are also shown on the chart. They indicate that the decline prob-44 0 UTSTANDINGS
Equal vertical distances represent equal ratios of change.
Outstcndings include straight issues only, January figures,
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ably continued to a trough of about $21 billion at the beginning
of 1946. Total outstandings then climbed rapidly, reaching about
$32 billion at the beginning of 1951.
From the evidence it is clear that outstandings exhibit negligible
conformity with short cycles in business activity. The oniy statis-
tics available before 1900 cover railroads back to 1876.1 They
show a continuous rise up to 1896 and a minor trough in the
following year. Since we know that rail debt was 79 percent of
the total in 1900, there is a suggestion that outstandings of the
combined industries may also have reached a minor trough
around 1897. If so, the series on total outstandings described only
one complete swing upward and downward during a period of
fifty years. This single expansion and contraction swing does not,
of course, constitute evidence of a long cycle, which implies re-
currence.
Industry and Size Distribution of Outstandings
Chart 3 presents the percentage distribution of annual outstand-
ings by major industry group, and may be used with the absolute
figures shown in Chart 2 to trace the principal movements in the
composition of outstandings since 1900.
The market for corporate bonds was predominantly a rail
market for the greater part of the period covered by our basic
series. To a considerable extent our present rail system was
already "in being" at the beginning of the century and funded
debt was already large: rail bonds amounted to $4.7 billion, or
79 percent of total outstandings, at that time. While in absolute
amount the volume of rail bond outstandings rose rather steadily
after the turn of the century to its maximum of $11.3 billion in
1932, during the same period it fell just as steadily in relation to
the volume of other issues, so that by 1932 it stood at only 39
percent of the total. Long-term rail debt then contracted mildly
to $9.5 billion in 1944 (42 percent of the total).
1 Pre-1900 estimates for railroads were obtained by chaining aggregate
balance sheet data on funded debt as given in Poor's Manual of Railroads
for 1900 to our 1900 estimates of outstandings. Poor's data were chained to
our straight bond estimate to obtain the figures shown in Chart 2 and
Table A-2, and to the estimate for issues of all types to obtain those given
in Table A-i. Although balance sheet data include some duplicating debt,
it is roughly eliminated by the chaining process.OUTSTANDINGS 47
increased steadily over the whole period; and in absolute volume,
utility bonds have been the dominant group in the bond market
since 1928. Estimates for recent years indicate that the mild
decline in utility outstandings that began in 1933 was abruptly
reversed after World War II. Utility outstandings at the begin-
fling of 1951 were 32 percent above their prewar (1988) peak
and currently account for about half of corporate bond out-
standings.
Except during the late twenties and the recent period of credit
expansion, industrial bonds have not occupied a position of
major importance in the corporate bond market. They stood at
only $0.3 billion in 1900 (5percentof total outstandings), in-
creased rapidly to $1.0 billion in 1903 (12 percent of the total),
and then grew somewhat irregularly—note the interruption in
1919-20—to a peak of $5.7 billion in 1929 (21 percent of total
outstandings). During the depression and war years industrial
outstandings contracted somewhat more sharply than did the
outstandings of the other two industry groups, reaching a low
of $2.4 billion by 1946 (11 percent of total outstandings). Both
in absolute and in relative terms, however, the postwar expansion
has been rapid: industrial outstandings nearly trebled after 1946,
so that by 1951 they constituted 20 percent of total outstandings.
Of the $82 billion of straight corporate bonds outstanding at the
beginning of 1951 approximately half were utilities; the rails ac-
counted for only slightly more of the remainder than the in-
dustrials.
It is interesting to speculate on the significance of the postwar
rise in funded debt, which may seem moderate or excessive de-
pending upon one's point of view. The postwar rise in outstand-
ings appears moderate when compared with the rise in the general
price level (Chart 2). It also appears moderate when viewed in
relation to the volume of funds obtained by corporations from
nondebt sources during the same period. Thus, undistributed
corporate profits for 1948 alone aggregated $12.8 billion, in this
one year exceeding the entire increase in funded debt between
1945 and 1951.2 On the other hand, corporate debt is large when
viewed against the background of its recent past; and the debt is
2Departmentof Commerce estimate of undistributed corporate profits
(domestic) as stated in Survey of Current Business, July 1950, Table 7,
p. 11.48 OUTSTANDINGS
still growing. From the investors' point of view, the most im-
portant question is whether corporate' earnings will suffice to
sustain the fixed charges arising out of this expanding volume of
funded debt, or whether, as after the twenties, the rapid debt
growth will be followed by heavy corporate defaults.
Table A-6, from which Chart 4 is drawn, gives par amount
figures, annually, for outstandings of straight bonds classffied by
large and small issues. For purposes of economic analysis this
simple breakdown is of limited use, since the $5 million limit
separating the large from the small issues has varied in signifi-
cance with the general growth and price trends in our society
since 1900. Its purpose was the purely technical one of selecting
the 10 percent sample of small issues, and its chief usefulness is
in checking the accuracy of certain of our estimates that are based
on sample data (cf. page 87). Detailed size breakdowns and
measures of size inequality, which require longer treatment than
would be convenient here, are reserved to a later monograph.
Chart 4 nevertheless throws some light on the changing for-
tunes of large and small issues. Comparison of trends in their
graphs indicates a relative displacement of small issues by large
issues. This displacement, which has been continuous since 1900,
was accelerated after 1929 with the abrupt fall in the absolute
volume of small issues outstanding. The emerging importance of
large issues is a development of some significance in the financial
history of the country, and will be touched on again at several
points.
Growth and Retardation Rates
The movements of the various series shown on Charts 2 and 4
may be summarized and compared most readily by means of
growth and retardation rates. When graphs are drawn, as here,
to ratio scale, with equal vertical distances implying equal per-
centage rates of growth, any series growing at a constant rate will
trace out a linear path. It will be noted that the paths of the
various series on outstandings are roughly linear over the succes-
sive short periods 1900-1909, 1909-20, 1920-82, 1932-46, and 1946-
51, industrials constituting the principal exception. It follows that
constant growth rates describe the behavior of the series over
these short periods with reasonable accuracy in most cases. Con-OUTSTANDINGS 49
stant short-period growth rates are presented in Table 2 up to
January 1, 1944, the terminal date of our basic estimates.
Over the full period 1900-1944 the various series on outstand-
ings appear to be concave to the time axis and to describe a
CHART 4—Corporate
1900-1944
Bond Outstandings by Size of Issue,
rough parabola. Abstracting from short-run deviations from trend,
this suggests (1) that the growth rate of each series decreased
with time and (2) that it decreased at a roughly constant rate.
The annual rate of decline in growth rate is called the retardation
rate; and when it is constant, the path of a series on a ratio
has a parabolic shape. If, for example, a series is growing atsome
particular point in time at the rate of 10 percent perannum and
has a constant retardation rate of 1 percent per annum, its growth
rate in succeeding years is 9 percent, 8 percent, and so on.
Table 2 presents, in addition to the short-period growth rates
From Toble A-6; straight bonds, Januaryfigures,par amount.50 OUTSTANDINGS
described above, estimates of the growth rates at the central year
(1922) and estimates of constant retardation rates.3
For each series the highest short-period growth rate occurred
in the first decade of the century. The rates of growth slackened
off over the period 1909-20, and then, except in the case of rails
and small issues, increased again in the twenties. It should be
The theory behind the estimates presented in Table 2 may be sum-
marized symbolically as follows: let
t=time
nlength of period
y ( t) = outstandings
= growth rate
r = retardation rate
Then for a series with constant growth rate and with time measured from





Constant short-period growth rates were computed by means of Eq. (1).
For a series describing a parabolic pattern when plotted on ratio scale,
logy(t) =log K+ (log a)t+log b)t2
y(t) =Katbt2/2
Since the growth rate at time t is defined as the relative change in outstand-





Placing the time origin at the central year (t = 0 in 1922)
(2) r(0)=loga
a —1,for small r
(The symbolindicates approximate equality.)
Differentiation of the growth rate gives
(3)
b—1,for small
From(3) it is evident that r is constant.
The parameters a and b were estimated for each series for the period
1900-1944 by the method of least squares and substituted in Eqs. (2) and
(3) to obtain the central-year growth rate and the retardation rate.
For a discussion of growth and retardation rates and their applications to
the analysis of economic time series, see Production Trends in the United












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































noted that the growth rates for rails and small issues also ac-
celerated in the twenties when compared with their growth rates
calculated over periods beginning a few years later than 1909
(say 1912). Crowth rates were uniformly negative in the thirties;
that is, all series declined. In each of the short periods identified
in Table 2 the growth rates for large issues were higher than for
small, a finding that confirms the earlier observation of the in-
creasing importance of large issues in the total of all issues out-
standing.
The last two lines in the table show that the rails had the
lowest central-year growth rate and the lowest retardation rate.
In other words, the growth of i-all debt was quite mild up to
its peak in 1932, and the decline was equally mild thereafter.
As is indicated by their high retardation rate, industrials were
the most volatile group. Industrial debt expanded rapidly up to
1929, and the contraction was sharp in the thirties and early
forties. The volatility of industrial outstandings is confirmed by
recent experience, industrials showing the most rapid growth
of any group in the expansion after World War II. Utilities had
the highest central-year growth rate and a moderate rate of
retardation. That is to say, utility outstandings continued to
grow for several years after the other series had turned down,
and the subsequent rate of contraction was about as mild as for
the rails.
The growth rate for small issues was virtually zero at the
central year (1922), and the retardation rate was fairly high.
We may infer, then, that growth rates for small issues are roughly
symmetrical about 1922, and that the steepest rates of growth
and decline occurred at the initial and terminal years of the
period studied. Outstandings of large issues not only started at
a much higher absolute level in 1900 than did the small issues,
but had a higher central-year growth rate and a lower rate of
retardation. It follows that they grew at all times at a more rapid
rate than the small issues and have occupied a position of in-
creasing importance in the market.
Average Size of Outstanding Issues
Chart 5 illustrates the dramatic increase in average size of out-
standing issues that has occurred since 1900, and particularly
since 1923. For all industries combined, the average size of issueOUTSTAND1NGS 53
was$2.3 million in 1900 and increased slowly to $3.1 million
at the beginning of 1923. The upward movement then accelerated,
so that by January 1, 1944 the average size reached $8.5 million,
more than two and a half times what it had been twenty years
before.
The increase was largely accounted for by bonds in the public
utility group, their average size in 1944 being four times what it
was in 1924. The average par amount of the rail issues outstand-
ing has always exceeded that of any other group, with the ex-
ception of industrials in a few of the early years. Moreover, the
average size of the rail issues has increased most regularly over
the years, growing by approximately constant increments of
$200,000 per year.
The anatomy of the changes occurring in the average par
amount of issues outstanding is revealed by comparing the move-
ments in the series for number of issues and aggregate par amount
of outstandings in Chart 5. The average par amounts were de-
rived by dividing the aggregate par amounts of issues outstand-
ing (Table A-2) by the number of issues (Table A-7). The two
latter series are plotted on ratio scale. So long as they move
parallel to each other (that is, so long as number and aggregate
par amount change at the same rate), the average remains un-
changed. The average rises if the number series increases more
slowly (or decreases more rapidly) than aggregate par amount,
and with converse changes the average falls.4 For the two large
groups, rails and utilities, the peak in the number of issues out-
standing occurred somewhat earlier than the peak in aggregate
par amount of outstandings, and the number of issues declined
more rapidly from its high. Thus there was a general upward
movement in average size of issue over the period studied. In
the case of industrials the two series entering into the average
moved alike, and the average therefore exhibits little trend.
Since these averages are for outstanding issues, they are affected by the
average size both of new offerings and of old issues extinguished. In some
periods, as is illustrated by the case of rail bonds since 1940, the dominant
factor causing an increase in average size of outstanding issues has been the
small size of old issues repaid or refunded into larger issues. It follows that
the average size of outstanding issues bears an uncertain relation to the
average size of new offerings. (Readers interested in analyzing the latter
may do so by comparing the series on number of offerings in Table A-9 with
the par amounts of offerings in Table A-2.)54 OUTSTANDINGS
CHART5—Number, and Aggregate and AveragePar
Amount, of Corporate Band Issues Outstanding, 1900-
1944
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Based on Tobles A-2 and A-7; straight bonds, January figures.
Number and aggregate amount of bond issues outstanding ore plotted on
ratio scale; average size of issue is plotted on arithmetic scale.56 OUTSTANDINGS
In each industry group, the principal cause of the increase
in average size of issue can usually be traced back to a prior
consolidation of obligors. The large railroad systems—most of
which had already been formed by 1900—were combinations of
a large number of small roads, each of which generally carried
its own underlying issues. The systems, as distinct from the
operating units, were financed in large part by "general and
refunding" issues secured by blanket mortgages junior to the
divisional issues. The indentures of the refunding issues usually
provided that the divisional bonds were to be pledged on retire-
ment as security under the blanket mortgages. These refunding
operations were carried out gradually over the period studied,
and the average size of outstanding rail issues steadily rose.
Both the number and the aggregate par amount of public
utility issues increased at about the same rate up to the mid-
twenties, and accordingly there was little change in average size.
The subsequent increase in average size of issue is attributable
in part to consolidations of street railways and of gas and electric
companies into larger operating systems, and in part to the grow-
ing number of public utility holding companies, which frequently
financed themselves by large public bond issues, transferring the
funds thus acquired through "downstream" loans to the operating
companies. Many small street railways not entering larger systems
were scrapped, and others were taken over by local municipalities,
events which also contributed to the rapid rise in average size
of issue of privately owned public utilities.
The indecisive movements in the average size of industrial
issues are linked with changes in the tempo of industrial con-
solidations and in the use of stock and bond instruments in ex-
ternal financing. Relatively few industrial bonds were outstand-
ing in the early years of the century, and these were dominated
by a few large issues. The movement toward industrial combina-
tion was well under way by 1900. The United States Steel Cor-
poration was founded in 1901 and in the same year borrowed
large sums through the sale of its 5's of 1951 (series A through
F), borrowing again in 1903 through the sale of its Collateral
Trust Sinking Fund 5's of 1963. Large amounts were also raised
in 1901 by the Consolidated Tobacco Company (merged in 1904
with the American Tobacco Company) by sale of its CollateralOUTSTANDINGS 57
Trust4's of 1951. Such concerns largely accounted for the abrupt
rise in average size of industrial issues between 1901 and 1904.
Around 1904, smaller corporations began to enter the bond
market, with the result that the number of issues rose more
rapidly than the aggregate par amount, and the average size
of issue fell. Changes in the capital structure of the Tobacco
Trust contributed further to the decline in average size of issue.
When Consolidated Tobacco Company was merged with Ameri-
can Tobacco in 1904, holders of the old bonds received 50 per-
cent in new bonds and the remainder in preferred stock. With
the dissolution of the Tobacco Trust in 1912, bondholders of
American Tobacco received 50 percent in cash and the remainder
in four smaller issues of P. Lorillard and Liggett and Myers. The
large U.S. Steel issues of 1901 and 1908 were also retired rapidly
but were not finally extinguished until 1929.
The general expansion in corporate funded debt in the twen-
ties was not reflected in the industrial averages. Although a sub-
stantial number of new issues appeared at that time, most were
of moderate size, the larger corporations preferring to finance
themselves by sale of stock rather than bonds. The average size
of issue for industrials did not rise appreciably until the late
thirties, when many issues were called and consolidated into
larger refunding issues.5
NET CHANCES IN
By definition, annual net changes in outstandings, which are
presented for straight bonds in Table A-2 and plotted on Chart
6, are differences between outstandings at the beginning and
the end of each calendar year. As the table indicates, they were
obtained by subtracting the annual par-amount total of extin-
guishments from that of offerings, and may therefore be inter-
preted as the net volume of new bond financing by the corporate
sector of the economy. Just as it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween the aggregate value of the physical assets of the economy
(i.e. national wealth) and the net increment to this wealth (in-
The rise occurred after the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933. This
act had the effect of adding the cost of registration to other flotation costs,
and may thus have worked against the flotation of small issues. On the other
hand, the underwriters' spread appears to have declined markedly since the
passage of the act. See Chapter 6, footnote 1.58 OUTSTANDINGS
CHART6—Net Changes in Corporate Bond Outstandings,
1900-1950
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From Tables A-2 and A-6; straight bonds, yearly totals, par amount.
Shaded areas, representing contractions in general business activity, and
white areas, representing expansions, are based on the National Bureau's
business cycle chronology; cf. Arthur F.Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell,
Measuring Business Cycles (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946),
p. 78.
vestment), so we must distinguish here between the aggregate
volume of claims on the national wealth in the form of corporate
bonds (i.e. corporate bond outstandings) and the increments
to these claims (net changes in outstandings).
From the standpoint of dynamic analysis the net change in
outstandings is a highly significant variable, although for certain
types of problems it may be less relevant than other series to
be considered later. In an analysis of the gross volume of funds
available for capital formation that were obtained through the
bond market, for example, we would be most interested in a
series covering new-money offerings (cf. Chapter 8). But when








pose is in question, the net change in outstandings is a more
pertinent variable.
The problem of interpreting the contribution of the net change
in outstandings to business expansions and contractions is com-
plicated by several factors. For one thing, the corporate bond
market is only one among several sources of funds for asset ex-
pansion, all of which should be examined jointly in a complete
analysis. Thus, under certain circumstances a given increment
to bond outstandings may be used to finance a net addition of
equal amount to the community's capital stock, while under
other circumstances it may be largely offset by a release of funds
to other markets.
Aside from such offsetting changes a second problem arises
in evaluating the effect of a change in outstandings on the ag-
gregate demand for goods and services. To state whether an ex-
panding debt always implies a net increase in aggregate demand
is not possible on purely theoretical grounds. The issue turns
on whether or not the funds borrowed (or repaid) are transferred
from idle to active hands. In practice, however, funds are usually
borrowed to be used and are seldom loaned if the lender has
more pressing commitments. Moreover, our data suggest that
repayments on bonded debt are usually made prior to maturity
and at the option of the borrower, which implies a voluntary
release of funds. In many cases, therefore, large increments in
outstandings may be interpreted as contributing to general busi-
ness expansion, and decrements as contributing to business con-
traction.
There is the further question of whether the bond market
contributes to business expansion only when outstandings are
growing (when the net change is positive), or only when the
net change itself is growing (when the change in the net change
is positive). Haberler, in his analysis of consumer credit, takes
the first view, interpreting an increase in outstandings as a factor
of expansion and a decrease as a factor of contraction. Abram-
ovitz, on. the other hand, in his study of manufacturers' in-
ventories, gives special attention to fluctuations in inventory in-
vestment (analogous to changes in the net change)Personally
6Readersinterested in the pros and cons of this question are referred to
Cottfried Haberler's Consumer Instalment Credit and Economic Fluctuations
(National Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program,OUTSTANDINGS
the writer inclines toward the latter point of view. But under
either interpretation it is still important to know at which stage
of the business cycle the net change is largest and at which stage
it is smallest. We shall therefore concentrate on movements in
the net change in bond outstandings, with occasional reference,
also, to its absolute level.
Working with annual data for major industry and size groups,
we first examine the secular drifts in the net changes in outstand-
ings and then consider briefly the behavior of these series over
business cycles. A more detailed cyclical analysis based on
monthly data will be presented in Chapter 4.
Trends in Net Changes
Except for the sharp upward movement between 1918 and 1927,
the general picture obtained from Chart 6 is one of down-
warddrift through 1945. Thereafter the net changes shot up-
ward to a record high in 1948. Although there has been some
abatement in the incremental changes since then, they were still
abnormally high in 1949 and 1950.
For the combined industries, net changes were positive up to
1982 as funded debt expanded and were generally negative after
that time as funded debt contracted. Through 1912, corporations
in the three major industry groups were about equally responsible
for the general expansion in funded debt; but during the period
spanning World War I only the utilities were persistent borrow-
ers. Thus, industrial corporations repaid funded debt on balance
in each of the years 1913, 1915, 1918, and 1919, and the rails did
so in 1916 and 1918. Funded debt expanded by unusually large
amounts in 1920-27 for industrial corporations and in 1923-27
for utilities. Railroad debt expanded in this period only in the
trough years of general business activity 1924 and 1927, and again
in the contraction year 1930.
For utilities and industrials 1927 was a peak year of net new
borrowing; for rails it was a minor peak. In 1928-29, however,
all three groups turned from bond to stock financing. The rail-
roads reduced funded debt only slightly in 1928. The decline
in industrial debt in 1929 was larger than that in any year but
1942), particularly pp. 69-80, and Moses Abramovitz's Inventories and
Business Cycles (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1950), particularly
pp. 330-31.62 OUTSTANDINGS
1935. Utility debt continued to expand, but by somewhat smaller
increments than in earlier years.
Throughout the thirties and up to the close of World War II,
contraction in funded debt was general; afterward all major in-
dustry groups returned to the captial market to obtain funds for
reconversion and expansion. In these developments the railroads
were generally laggards. As is well known, rail earnings were
extremely low in the thirties, and the roads were unable to free
themselves of their excessive debt burdens until the period of
higher earnings ushered in by World War II. They did not again
become net borrowers until 1948, two years later than the other
two industry groups. Moreover, utilities and industrial corpora-
tions have been appreciably heavier net borrowers than the rail-
roads throughout the postwar period.
As Chart 6 indicates, the absolute amplitude of variation of
the net change in outstandings for large issues was slightly smaller
through 1943 than for all issues, but the year-to-year movements
of the two series were essentially the same. Small issues had a
much smaller amplitude than all issues and large issues. The
trend of the net changes for small issues, persistently downward
over the period 1900-1943, illustrates a point mentioned earlier,
that there was first a slowing up in the rate of growth of small
issues outstanding, followed by an actual decline.
Annual Movements in Net Changes
over Business
Corporate bond outstandings, we have seen, show no evidence
of short-mn cyclical movements. In the net change in outstand-
ings, however, marked cyclical swings will appear.
To reveal whether movements in net changes in outstandings
are associated with general business activity, peak and trough
years have been plotted on Chart 6 from the National Bureau's
chronology of reference-cycle turning points, and reference con-
tractions have been shaded.7 The annual data on net changes
in outstandings, though in some respects inferidr for cyclical
analysis to the monthly or quarterly data, nevertheless exhibit
definite inverse conformity with business cycles. Thus, out of
Cf. Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946), p. 78.OUTSTAND1NGS 63
twenty possible comparisons at reference-cycle turns through
the trough in 1938 we can detect fifteen inverse coincidences in
the combined-industries series(counting the near-trough in
1923 as an inverse coincidence), a number far too large to be
accounted for solely on the basis of chance.8
The cyclical conformity of a series may be measured most
conveniently by use of the National Bureau's conformity indexes,
which will be described more fully in Chapter 4. Conformity
indexes for the annual series are presented in Table 3 for ex-
pansion and contraction phases and for the full cycle. A negative
expansion index indicates that the series has generally moved
downward during expansion phases of business cycles, while a
negative contraction index shows that it has generally moved
upward during contraction phases. Thus, the almost entirely
negative results in the first two columns of the table suggest that
the various series on net changes in outstandings are inverted
with respect to business cycles, a conclusion that will be borne
out by the more detailed analysis of Chapter 4.
TABLE 3—Conformity Indexes for Net Changes in Outstand-
ings of Corporate Bonds: Ten Reference Cycles 1900-
1938
Expansion Contraction Full cycle
All industries —20 —80 —68
Railroads —60 —60 —68
Public utilities —20 —40 —26
Industrials +20 —40 —5
Large issues —40 —80 —68
Small issues —40 —60 —58
Based on annual data, Tables A-2 and A-6; these indexes do not take
account of possible leads or lags at reference-cycle turning points.
Expansion indexes for a series with a strong downward trend
may be negative even though the short-run movements of the
8 Our basic series cover only ten complete reference cycles, 1900-1938,
being extended by rough estimates to later years only in the case of out-
standings and the net changes in outstandings. For the sake of intercom-
parability between the cyclical analyses of various series, the later inforrna-
tion available for net changes is not utilized in this connection; but see
footnote 9.64 OL1TSTAND1NGS
series are totally unrelated to general business expansions; simi-
larly, contraction indexes for such a series may be positive. The
full-cycle conformity indexes in Table 3 are computed so as to
adjust for the disturbing influences of trend. They are negative
in all cases, and confirm the impression of definite inverse con-
form ity.9
The evidence of the annual par-amount data suggests that the
corporate bond market performs a contracyclic function, supply-
ing, on balance, an increasing volume of funds to the corporate
sector during general business contractions and a diminishing
volume during general business expansions. Detailed study of
this important suggestion must be delayed until monthly data
can be examined and cash series developed (Chapters 4 and 6).
It is interesting to note in passing, however, that the exceptional
behavior of the net-change series in 1932 provides some evidence
to the effect that the corporate bond market is typically a market
of last resort. After the 1929 collapse of the stock market, out-
standings at first expanded in the usual contracyclic way. But the
deteriorating credit position of domestic railroad and industrial
concerns, coupled with international monetary disturbances, led
to a bad break in the bond market in September 1931.'° The
market could not therefore perform its typical contracyclic func-
tion at the trough in 1932, and the virtual credit blockage that
developed in that year no doubt contributed to the severity of
the ensuing depression. Conversely, the atypical behavior of the
net-change series in 1947-48 may have been caused in part by
the weakness of the stock market in that period. Later analysis
Monthly and quarterly data to be examined in Chapter 4 suggest that
the net changes for the all-industry totals typically lead reference turns by a
few months, but this does not show up in the annual data. The absolute
values of most of the indexes of Table 3 are reduced slightly when recom-
puted to cover the two later cycles 1938-49, since the net changes conform
inversely to the first of them and positively to the second.
10Afinancial crisis had occurred in Austria in May 1931, with the failure
of the Credit-Anstalt, and the disturbance quickly spread to New York via
the Berlin and London markets. England's suspension of gold payments in
September was the occasion for a general liquidation of foreign security
holdings in New York and adverse gold movements. To protect the dollar
the Federal Reserve banks raised the discount and bill rates, thus contributing
further to the strain on the domestic bond market.OFFERINGS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS 65
of the relationship between stock and bond financing will strongly
suggest that conclusion.
OFFERINGS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS
Annual par-amount estimates of straight bond offerings and ex-
tinguishments—the two components of the net change in out-
standings—are presented in Table A-2 and are plotted in Chart
7. These basic estimates are global in the sense that they cover
the total volume of new bond instruments created and of old
instruments extinguished. Total offerings include both cash and
noncash transactions, and bonds offered to refund other issues
as well as those offered for new-money purposes. The extinguish-
ment series also include cash and noncash transactions, bonds
refunded by other capital issues, and actual debt repayments.
Analysis of the constituent series belongs to the following chapter.
Of the gross estimates of offerings and extinguishments now to
be examined it should be noted that they are mutually con-
sistent: together they completely determine the net change in
outstandings.
Secular and Cyclical Movements in the Annual Series
on Offerings and Extinguishments
Secular and cyclical movements in straight bond offerings and
extinguishments may be analyzed from Chart 7, on which are
also plotted the National Bureau's reference-cycle turning points.
The net change in outstandings (i.e. the difference between of-
ferings and extinguishments) is shown as a white area between
the two graphs when positive and as a shaded area when nega-
tive. As we have seen, until about 1932 offerings exceeded ex-
tinguishments and the debt grew. After that, extinguishments
usually exceeded offerings, the net change in outstandings turned
negative, and the volume of funded debt declined.
The annual movements in offerings, extinguishments, and net
changes in outstandings are irregular, and the relationships among
these series are not particularly simple. In Chapters 3 and 4
materials will be presented that show the reasons behind many
of these irregular movements, and a few illustrations may be
brought in here to illuminate the evidence of the chart. In 1918,
for example, offerings for the combined industries were relatively
low, because of the restrictions imposed by the Capital Issues66 OFFERINGSAND EXTING UISHMENTS
CHART7—Offerings versus Extinguishments of Corporate
,Bonds, 1900-1943
From Table A-2; straight bonds, yearly totals, par amount.
Shaded areas represent contractions in general business activity and white
areas represent expansions (Burns and Mitchell, op.cit., p. 78).
20 24
— Offerings Positive net change
Extinguishments Negative net changeOFFERINGS AND EXTINGU1SHMENTS 67
Committee on new security flotations. But extinguishments were
also quite low in that year, considering their general upward
trend. The net change in outstandings declined but was still
positive, indicating that despite the restriction on borrowing,
corporations continued to obtain funds on balance through the
corporate bond market.
The drop in offerings in 1928-29 was associated with the rise
in the stock market, and the peak in 1930 with the drying up
of that source. The decline in offerings and extinguishments
during 1932-34 was caused by the disorganization of the securities
markets in those years, and the reduced volume of extinguish-
ments was effected principally through a reduction in voluntary
refundings. On the other hand, the peaks in both offerings and
extinguishments in 1936 and 1939-41 were caused mainly by
the large volume of issues voluntarily refunded at the low in-
terest rates prevailing then. Moreover, extinguishments exceeded
offerings, and the volume of funded debt declined. The drop in
offerings in 1987 reflects the unsettled state of the securities
markets in that year. In 1988 bond offerings rose slightly but
extinguishments fell, so that business corporations were actually
net borrowers of funds.
A close examination of Chart 7 indicates that corporate bond
offerings have usually moved inversely with cycles in general
business activity and that extinguishments have moved with them
directly. Conformity indexes summarizing the behavior of these
series over business cycles are presented in Table 4. The general
impression obtained is one of moderate to high negative con-
formity for offerings and of moderate to low positive conformity
for extinguishments
Comparisonof the expansion and contraction indexes sug-
gests that the tendency for offerings to conform negatively was
strongest over contraction phases of the cycle, whereas the tend-
ency for extinguishments to conform positively was strongest
11Itis interesting that offerings and extinguishments have opposite con-
formity to business cycles despite the fact that they are positively correlated
with each other (cf. Table 5). The reason for the positive correlation is that
they containa common component, refundings. When refundingsare
omitted, the residual series (new-money offerings and repayments) in general
have opposite conformity to business cycles and are virtua]ly uncorrelated
with each other (cf. Tables 13 and 14).68 OFFERiNGS AND EXTINGUI.SHMENTS
during business expansions. Both tendencies are probably as-
sociated with the generally rising trends in the series. The nega-
tive full-cycle indexes for offerings indicate that these series
usually rose during business contractions, or fell at a less rapid
rate than in preceding and succeeding expansions; during busi-
ness expansions, on the other hand, offerings usually fell, or rose
TABLE 4—Conformity Indexes for Offerings and Extinguish-
ments of Corporate Bonds: Ten Reference Cycles 1900-
1938















































Based on annual data, Tables A-2 and A-6; these indexes do not take
account of possible leads or lags at reference-cycle turning points.
at a less rapid rate than during contractions. Conversely, the
positive full-cycle indexes for the extinguishment series suggest
that in most cases bond extinguishments fell during business con-
tractions, or rose at a less rapid rate than in expansions; during
business expansions, on the other hand, they rose, or fell at a less
rapid rate than in contractions.
From the above, it appears that the net change in outstand-
ings, which is the difference between offerings and extinguish-
ments, necessarily has negative conformity; this conclusion agrees
with our finding in Table 3. Net new bond financing tends to
decline in expansion phases of the cycle (or to rise at a less rapid
rate than in contractions), since bond offerings fall at this time
while extinguishments rise; and for phases of contraction the con-OFFERINGS AND EXTINGUISIIMENTS 69
verse tendency is shown. These findings are substantially in agree-
ment with the conclusions to be advanced in Chapter 4, where
monthly and quarterly data will be used and allowance can be
made for "leads" and "lags" in the data.'2
Influence of Offerings and Extinguishments
on Net Changes in Outstandings
The various bond series we have been observing separately,
in the main, should also be considered in relation to each other.
The basic question of interest here is whether a given volume of
new offerings usually produces a substantially similar increase
in outstandings or whether the new offerings are usually offset
by an approximately equal volume of extinguishments.
This question has received little attention in analyses of debt
statistics; yet it has important theoretical and practical implica-
tions, particularly as it relates to the influence of monetary policy
on the bond market. As is well known, the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem seeks to influence the tempo of economic activity through
control of the availability and cost of credit. Its policy includes
the use not only of general credit controls of the traditional type
but also of selective controls over particular credit markets.
Selective controls over the bond market were first applied by
the Capital Issues Committee during World War I. Under the
Defense Production Act of 1950 a selective system of control
was also applied to bond flotations by the National Voluntary
Credit Restraint Committee, in cooperation with the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Effective control over the volume of any type of credit clearly
implies control of outstandings or of the net change in outstand-
12Onlya rough idea of the timing may be obtained from the annual data.
Our analysis suggests that annual bond offerings for the combined industries
typically expand from the peak of the business cycle (stage v) to the middle
of the following expansion (stage m); but annual conformity indexes com-
puted on that basis show little improvement over the ones given in Table 4,
being —40 for expansions, —80 for contractions, and —58 for the full
cycle. For extinguishments, on the other hand, the conformity improves
markedly. Annual extinguishments typically expand during the first half
of business expansions (stages i-rn), and conformity indexes computed
accordingly are +64, +20, and +60. Both the conformity indexes and the
timing are altered slightly when based on monthly or quarterly data (cf.
Table 16; the cycle stages are defined on page 135).70 OFFERINGS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS
ings. General and selective controls exercised by the monetary
authority do not affect outstandings (or the net change) directly,
but indirectly through the primary markets for new loans—in the
case of corporate bonds through the market for offerings. It is
therefore important to. know whether bond offerings are a good
indicator of the net change in outstandings.
In the case of instalment sales credit, new credit granted
(analogous to our total bond offerings) is a good indicator of the
net change. Because such creditisextinguished in regular
monthly instalments, the aggregate volume of extinguishments
is more stable than the volume of new loans made.'3 Any altera-
tion in the volume of new credit granted is coupled with an
immediate change in the same direction in the volume of loans
outstanding. From the statistical point of view, the distinguish-
ing features of markets of this type, in which a new-loan series
is an efficient indicator of the net credit change, are (1) that
offerings exhibit a greater amplitude of variation than extinguish-
ments, and (2) that the two series are not highly correlated.
Chart 8 shows that the corporate bond market does not have
those characteristics. For all industries combined, total offerings
and extinguishments have fluctuated over approximately the
same range during the period of study. Moreover, the two series
exhibit fairly high correlation, since both of them include bonds
offered to refund other bonds. It follows that the year-to-year
movements in the net changes in outstandings not only are
smaller than the movements in bond offerings but also are not
highly correlated with them. Thus a series on gross bond offer-
ings is a rather poor indicator of both trends and cycles in the
net change in outstandings.
Table 5 gives the correlation coefficients for the various in-
dustry groups between the paired series of offerings, extinguish-
ments, and net changes in outstandings, along with ratios of the
variance of offerings to the variance of extinguishments; in gen-
eral, it supports the conclusions just stated.'4 In each case, the
'3Theaggregate volume of extinguishments owes its stability to the fact
that it is, in effect, a moving average of the volume of credit granted in the
past.
14 ratios measure relative variability; a definition of the variance
is given in the technical note at the end of this chapter. Of interest prin-
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range of variation for offerings was approximately the same as
for extinguishments during the period 1900-1943 (the ratios of
the variances are close to unity). Moreover, the correlation be-
tween offerings and extinguishments was fairly high for bonds
of the combined industries and for utilities and industrials; hence
for these groupings the correlation between offerings and net
changes and between extinguishments and net changes was low.
Public utility bonds in the period of early growth, 1900-1907,
show behavior very like that typified by the instalment sales
credit market, where new credit granted carries over directly
to outstandings. Utility offerings and extinguishments appear
virtually uncorrelated in those years, with a positive correlation
of only 0.15; and extinguishments were quite stable
in relation to offerings, the offerings-extinguishrnents variance
ratio being 21.8. Virtually all of the new flotations of public
utility issues therefore contributed to the sharp rise in outstand-
ings over the eight years: the correlation coefficient between
offerings and net changes in outstandings was +0.98. These con-
ditions did not hold, however, over the whole period studied,
1900-1943.
The behavior of railroad bonds over the period 1900-1943
considered as a unit provides an interesting example of a group
for which a bond-offerings series is a moderately good index
of the net change. Offerings and extinguishments were virtually
uncorrelated during the period of study (r=+0.17), and both
series fluctuated over approximately the same range (the variance
ratio was 1.37). For this particular group—and for this group
only—the correlation between offerings and net changes over
the entire period was fairly high (+0.71). As a result, approxi-
mately half of the year-to-year movements in the net change in
outstandings for rail bonds were accounted for by new offer-
ings.'5
To summarize, the general impression obtained from Chart 8
and Table 5isthat the net change in outstandings is not closely
of the net change in outstandings is completely determined in the statistical
sense by the variance ratio for offerings and extinguishments and by the
correlation between them, and develops a joint test of significance for the
variance ratio and correlation coefficient.
15Justificationfor this statement is given in the technical note at the end
of the chapter.74 OFFERINGS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS
related to a change in total bond offerings, the rail group being
the only exception. One reason for this lack of relationship,
notable when the bond series are compared with, say, the cor-
responding series for instalment sales credit, is that corporate
bonds have extremely long terms to maturity, whereas consumer
loans are relatively short-term. In the case of instalment sales
credit, the old loans run off quickly, and a reduction of new
loans has an immediate effect on outstandings. Since most bonds
mature in the distant future, many years would be required to
effect a proportional change in funded debt outstanding. Another
reason for the independence of the series is that most bonds,
unlike instalment credit loans, have optional maturity features,
so that the contractual and actual dates of repayment frequently
do not coincide. Thus if gross bond offerings expand in response
to favorable market conditions, the proceeds of the offerings
may be used largely to call and refund other issues before ma-
turity. In the thirties, for example, the volume of funded debt
outstanding actually declined (the net changes were negative)
despite official encouragement of bond offerings.
NUMBER OF YEARS FROM OFFERING TO EXTINGUISHMENT
The optional maturity feature of corporate bonds also presents a
problem for the investor who attempts to space the maturities in
his portfolio so that funds will flow in as needed. Since bonds are
frequently called at the option of the obligor or are repaid at
some date other than maturity because of a default situation, the
maturity date is almost completely untrustworthy as a means of
determining the timing of repayments in the future.
The investor's problem is complicated further by the fact that
his requirements for funds may shift in an unforeseen way with
general economic conditions. For example, when the investor is
losing funds, the ideal bond portfolio is one with sufficiently
large extinguishments to meet the drain on cash. In other times,
when funds are flowing on balance toward him, his pressing
problem becomes one of keeping the funds at work; that is, of
providing investment outlets both for funds released from old
obligations and for the net, new acquisitions of cash. But' over
the period 1900-1943, as we shall see, the actual length of life of
corporate bonds—the number of years from offering to extin-
guishment—has been shortest during general business expansionsOFFERINGS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS 75
when funds were flowing toward the large investment inter-
mediaries in excess of the usual amounts. And contrariwise, dur-
ing periods of general business contraction, when investment
funds were flowing toward the intermediaries in less than the
usual amounts, the average life of corporate bonds has lengthened.
Median Period from Offering to Maturity
and from Offering to Extinguishment
The changes that have occurred in the life spans of corporate
bonds may be analyzed directly by computing for each offering
the number of years between the dates of offering and of final
extinguishment, and by averaging these over different periods.
Such an approach to the problem of measurement has the advan-
tage of ease of interpretation but the disadvantage that the mean
number of years from offering to extinguishment for a group of
bonds cannot be determined until all the bonds offered are finally
extinguished. The disadvantage may be overcome in part by em-
ploying the median instead of the mean, since the median number
of years to extinguishment is determined as soon as 50 percent or
more of the bonds offered are extinguished. Yet for short or recent
periods the 50 percent point is not always reached. It has been
necessary, therefore, to work with fairly large groups of bonds,
and to exclude bonds offered after 1939.
Table 6 presents median terms to maturity and to extinguish-
ment (median number of years from offering date to maturity
date and from offering date to date of final extinguishment) for
offerings of all large issues made during the period 1900-1939, and
for those offered in the two subperiods 1900-1929 and
Thesemedians are based on the number of offerings and hence
give no effect to differences in the size of various offerings. More-
over, they cover only the period from offering to final extinguish-
ment, and give no effect to parts of issues extinguished through
sinking fund calls, etc.'7
18Largeissues are those whose offerings summed to $5 million or more.
17Themedian term to extinguishment refers to the number of years that
bonds were on the books of the obligor, not the books of any particular
investment institution. This distinction is important in the case of corporate
bonds, which enjoyed an active secondary market during most of the years
covered by our records. It is much less in the case of mortgage
loans, which are seldom transferred without the redrafting of the contract75 OFFERINGSAND EXTINGUISHMENTS
Owing possibly to the higher costs of long-term as compared
with short-term borrowing in the thirties, and perhaps also to
a growing skepticism on the part of obligors and investors about
TABLE 6—Median Number of Years from Offering to Ma-








































Based on special tabulations of Corporate Bond Project data supple-
mented by a search of financial sources for extinguishment data in recent
years. The data include only offerings of large straight issues.
the wisdom of extremely long maturities, the terms to maturity
of bonds of the combined industries offered in that decade were
shorter by 15 percent than the terms characterizing earlier years.
The decrease was greatest for the rails and industrials, where the
median term fell from 35 to 26 years and from 16 to 12 years
(i.e. the "extinguishment" of the loan). For this reason our figures are
roughly comparable with estimates developed in the National Bureau's
institutional studies of mortgage loan experience. See, however, C. Lowell
Harriss's History and Policies of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation (Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program, 1951),
pp. 170-180, for a discussion of the sale, at liquidation of the HOLC, of an
appreciable volume of mortgage loans without change of contract.OFFERINGS AND EXTINGUJSHMENTS 77
respectively. The median term remained at about 25 years for
utilities.
An even more dramatic change occurred in the actual length of
life of bonds offered in the two subperiods. As measured by
median term to extinguishment, the life span of offerings short-
ened from about 16 to 7 years. An equal shortening of median
term to extinguishment by roughly 50 percent occurred in each
of the major industry groups.18
By comparing the median number of years from offering to
maturity with the median number of years from offering to
extinguishment, we obtain some indication of the unreliability of
the maturity date as an indicator of the actual length of life of
corporate bonds. For all industries combined, the median num-
ber of years over which bonds offered in the period 1900-1939
were actually outstanding was approximately half the contractual
term (14 years versus 26 years). For bonds offered in the thirties
the actual term was less than one-third the contractual term (7
years versus 22 years). These figures emphasize the difficulties
that plague those who attempt to maintain properly spaced
portfolios, particularly in periods of falling interest rates such as
the thirties and early forties.'9
Turnover Rates and Their Use in Estimating the
Number of Years from Offering to Extinguishment
The annual turnover rate of corporate bonds, as used here, is the
ratio, in percentage form, of the par amount of extinguishments
during a calendar year to the par amount of all the issues out-
18 The median number of years from offering to extinguishment would
doubtless have been even shorter if it could have included offerings made
between 1939 and 1944.
19 Corporations were able to effect considerable reductions in interest costs
during the thirties and early forties by refunding old bonds at Lower rates
of interest (cf. page 243). The savings, however, were not so large as they
might have been if the corporations had been able to make reliable forecasts
of the future course of rates of interest. During that period short-term in-
terest rates were consistently below long-term rates; nevertheless corporations
initially refunded their old bonds into 22-year maturities on the average,
and then, as interest rates continued to fall, repaid or refunded the new
obligations in a little over seven years. An initial decision to issue 7-year
maturities would have resulted in a further saving in interest costs (approxi-
mately one-half percent annually, the average differential between 22-year
and 7-year money rates during the thirties).78 OFFERiNGS AND EXTINGU1SHMENTS
standing at the beginning of that year. The annual rates for
straight bonds are shown in Chart 9 and are summarized for a
few significant periods in Table 7.
Since outstandings form a smooth series, annual turnover rates
are highly correlated with the annual par amount of extinguish-
ments, and the short-run movements in one series may be in-
ferred from the other. The principal advantage of the turnover
rates over a series on bond extinguishments is that the reciprocal
of these rates throws some light on the length of life of corporate
bonds. For example, a turnover rate of 5 percent per annum con-
tinuing over a period of several years would show that one-
twentieth of the outstandings were being retired in each year,
and would imply an average length of life of corporate bonds,
during the period, of about twenty years. Unlike the medians
examined above, the annual turnover rates have the advantage
of reflecting extinguishments through sinking fund calls, etc. as
well as final extinguishments. From a computational viewpoint,
an additional advantage isthat the turnover rateis always
defined, no matter how short the period over which it is com-
puted. As can be seen from Chart 9, however, turnover rates
computed over a period as short as a year are highly unstable.
The reciprocal of the annual turnover rate cannot be used to
determine the average length of life of corporate bonds unless
the rate remains roughly constant for a long period of years.
Since the actual rates moved rapidly and erratically, the recipro-
cals throw light only in a qualitative sense on the broad drift in
the length of life of corporate bonds.2°
Chart 9 indicates an upward and approximately linear drift in
20Ananalogous situation arises in interpreting population statistics. The
present U.S. crude death rate (the analogue of our turnover rate) of about
ten per 1,000 does not imply an average lifeexpectancyof 100 years, al-
though the continuous decline in this rate does reflect the fact that life
expectancy is higher now than in years gone by. The current rate is based
on a population with a larger proportion in the lower age brackets than can
be expected to reproduce itself in the future. Over short periods, it would
theoretically be possible for the crude death rate to drift downward without
any change in average life span, solely as a result of a rise in the proportion
entering the lower age brackets. The turnover rate on corporate bonds may
be influenced similarly, although this is not so likely, owing to the relatively
weak association between age of bond and the years remaining to cx-
tinguishn'ient.OFFERINGS AND
CHART9—Annual Turnover Rates for Corporate Bonds,
1900-1943
Based on Tables A-2 and A-6; for straight bonds.
Shaded oreos represent contractions in general business activity and white
areas represent expansions (Burns and Mitchell, op.cit., p. 78).
Trend lines were fitted by the method of least squares.
7980 OFFERiNGS AND EXT1NGUISHMENTS
turnover rates for each industry and size group. The upward drift
was pronounced for utilities, industrials, and small issues; it was
less pronounced for large issues and the issues of all groups com-
bined, and was smallest for rails. The principal conclusion to be
drawn from the chart is that there was a more or less continuous
fall in the length of life of corporate bonds over the period
studied.
A close examination of the chart indicates that turnover rates,
like bond extinguishments, frequently reach peaks during business
expansions, a conclusion that will be supported by the detailed
analysis of extinguishments in Chapter 4. The implication to be
drawn from the rise in turnover rates in periods of general busi-
ness expansion is that corporate bonds then take on an illusory
liquidity—illusory since the turnover rates subsequently fall in
late expansion or early contraction phases of the cycle.
Table 7 shows that the average of the annual turnover rates for
the entire period 1900-1943 was 5.8 percent for the bonds of all
industries combined, and was highest for industrials and lowest
for rails. These rates imply a period from offering to extinguish-
ment of 17.2 years for all issues, and of 9.0 years for industrials,
15.4 years for utilities, and 30.3 years for rails. The same order
of industrial differences held in both of the subperiods 1900-1934
and 1935-43, but the differences were more marked in the
latter period than in the former. In 1985-43 many public utility
and industrial issues were refunded at lower interest rates, with
an attendant shortening of length of life of issues in these groups.
The railroads were not then in a position to take advantage of
the lower interest rates, since many of the callable rail bonds
were selling at substantial discounts from call price and a large
proportion of the remaining bonds were long-term and non-
callable.
For various reasons the life span of corporate bonds as implied
by the turnover rates is not directly comparable with the median
period from offering to extinguishment. For one thing, the recip-
rocal of a turnover rate should be expected to behave like a
mean, and for a distribution such as the one under examination
(skewed toward long life spans) it should be larger than the
median. For another, computation of the median frequently
required the use of extinguishment data for the years 1944-50,
whereas the turnover rates are all based on extinguishments forOFFERINGS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS 81
earlier years. The difference in period of coverage introduces a
particularly serious discrepancy in the case of rail bonds, which
had the longest terms to extinguishment. Despite these and other
conceptual differences, the broad conclusions obtained from the
TABLE 7—Average Annual Turnover Rates, and Implied
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Based on annual data, Tables A-2 and A-6.
two sets of data are essentially similar. Over the period as a
whole there was a shortening in the life span of corporate bonds
both as implied by the turnover rates and as observed in the
medians. Rail bonds had the lowest turnover rates and longest
median period from offering to extinguishment. Industrials had
the highest turnover rates and the shortest median period.82 TECHNiCAL NOTE
TECHNICAL STATISTICAL NOTE
ON MARKET STRUCTURE
Economic variables are frequently joined by accounting identities,
as in the following examples:
Consumer outlay =Disposableincome —Savings
Corporate retained earningsIncome after taxes —Dividendspaid
Net change in bond outstandingsOfferings —Extinguishments
Other examples will arise in Chapters 3, 5, and 6. In the analysis of
such series the important question is: what effect does each of the
component variables (those in the right-hand member of the identity)
have on the resultant (the left-hand member)? Thus, in the corporate
bond field, we wish to study the influence of offerings and extinguish-
ments on the net change in outstandings.
Classical correlation methods, both multiple and simple, may be
inapplicable to such data. When the multiple correlation technique is
applied to concurrent data (that is, where each set of observations
covers the same interval of time), the multiple and partial correla-
tion coefficients and the regression coefficients are all identically equal
to plus or minus one. The multiple correlation technique thus con-
tributes nothing that is not already known a priori to an understand-
ing of the concurrent behavior of variables joined by an accounting
identity; it creates meaning in the statistical sense only when the
identity is broken by lagging certain of the variables by some speci-
fied time interval. To do so, however, changes the nature of the
economic problem under investigation (or the theory being tested);
it does not help explain relationships among concurrent variables.
Simple correlation techniques sometimes yield more interesting
results when applied to accounting identities, but the results are
frequently biased or difficult to interpret. Thus, the coefficient of
determination (the square of the correlation coefficient) has an un-
ambiguous meaning only in certain limiting cases that are seldom
encountered in practice; in addition, the simple regression coefficient
is frequently biased, so that this statistic is generally unacceptable.
It is proposed, first, to show that the behavior of variables joined
by an identity is completely described by two parameters of the
system; second, to illustrate how different types of credit markets
may be classified on the basis of the two parameters; and third, to
develop a method for testing hypotheses about the behavior of the
variables in the identity and for setting up confidence regions for the
parameters. The method is quite general: it may be extended to cover
all linear accounting identities in which n components have the
multivariate normal distribution and to nonlinear identities involving
ratios in which the components have the logarithmic normal distri-
bution.TECHNiCAL NOTE 83
1. Parameters Characterizing Market Structure
Accounting identities of the simple type treated here may be ex-
pressed in the form
(1.1) X1=X2—X3
Consider a sample of N observations on the X's, say, ON: (xia,
X2a,X3a) a.1,..., N,N > 2. The sample means (k), variances
(se), covariances (Sjj), and correlation coefficients (rq) are defined
as follows:
=
(1.2) (Xia (Xja —
= (i,J,= 1,2,3)
The corresponding population parameters are defined analogously
but are written in Greek letters.
By substituting sample values in Eq. (1.1), expressing them in
terms of deviations about the sample means, and squaring and sum-
ming both members, we obtain the relation
(1.3) 811822 + — 2s23
Taking expected values in Eq: (1.1) shows that a similar relation
holds between the population variances and covariances, Viz.,'
(1.4) + —2q23
Expressions of the type (1.3) hold for all samples in which the
variables are joined by an accounting identity of the type (1.1);
expressions of the type (1.4) hold forall populations similarly
defined provided only that the population variances and covariances
exist. The relationships (1.3) and (1.4) are thus "distribution-free."
It is to be shown first that the behavior of the variables in the
accounting identity is completely determined by the ratio of the
variances of the two components (X2 and and by the correlation




1 S.S. Wilks, Mathematical Statistics (Princeton, 1944), p. 34.84 TECHNiCAL NOTE
and the corresponding relationships among the variances and co-
variances:
— — (733 +2(728=0
(1.6) —+(733
+ C133 —20-19 0
The system (1.6) is homogeneous and linear in the six variances
and covariances and is of rank 3. For such a system it can be shown
that when the columns of the matrix corresponding to a certain three
unknowns constitute a matrix of rank 3, then the remaining three
unknowns may be assigned arbitrarily and may be regarded as
parameters in terms of which the other three unknowns are deter-
mined.2 An examination of Eqs. (1.6) shows that we can pick
any two variances and any covariance and determine a solution. In
particular, if we pick and thenwe can solve for
andcr13.Let 0-12, besuch a solution;
then it is clear that ..., isalso a solution. Thus, if
C= 11(733a unique solutionis obtained for
interms of the ratios Finally, since
0-23/0-33 P23' aunique solution of Eqs. (1.6) exists in
terms of the assigned parameters p3),which was to be
proved. It is evident from the relevant definitions and by use of
Eqs. (1.6) that the other two correlation coefficients (pj2' p13)and
all of the regression coefficients (thy)arealso determined by these
parameters. Thus a single variance ratio and correlation coefficient
completely determine the behavior of the variables in the accounting
identity—that is, their relative variation and covariation. It should
be noted that the two parameters of the system considered here are
invariant under a linear magnification of the common scale on which
X1, X2, andare measured.
System (1.6) shows that the variance of the resultant is
equal to the sum of the variances of the components (cr22+°-38)plus
or minus a factor that depends on the correlation between compo-
nents. 'When the components are uncorrelated, 0-23= 0and=
0-22 + Substitutionof this value of0-11intothe second and third
equations of (1.6) shows that p128= and = o22/o11. It
follows that when the components have low correlation, the propor-
tion of the total variation in X1 attributable to each component is
approximately equal to the square of the appropriate correlation
coefficient.
When the component series have high correlation, the proportion
of the total variation directly attributable to each component usually
cannot be determined so simply. However, the intercorrelation may
be neglected for practical purposes when the variance of one corn-
2A.C. Aitken, Determinants and Matrices (Edinburgh, 1939), p. 69.TECHNICAL NOTE 85
ponent is large in comparison with that of the other, as is shown
by expressing the first of the equations in (1.6) in the two forms
I











sinceP23isbounded above and below. In other words, when the
variance of one component is large in relation to that of the other,
the variance of the resultant is approximately equal to the variance
of the larger component.
2.Classification of Hypothetical Credit Markets
on the Basis of Two Parameters
Four hypothetical cases are presented to illustrate how various types
of credit markets may be described in terms of the two underlying
parameters of the system:
In markets of type A, offerings (new credit granted) and extin-
guishments are virtually independent (e.g. free of refundings), and
extinguishments form a smooth series in relation to offerings. Statis-
tically speaking, the requirements are that in the limitP23= 0and
=0.Eqs. (1.6) and (1.8) show that when these conditions
hold, 'T11/'T22= P12 1andP13= 0.In short, the market is com-
pletely characterized by the two parameters andP23•Forsuch
markets the net change is perfectly correlated with offerings and is
independent of extinguishments: thus a series on new credit granted
is a reliable indicator of net credit change. Type A is often approxi-
mated in reality. Over short periods, the market for instalment sales
credit approaches it. Note also the utility bond market over the
period 1900-1907 (Table 5).
Markets of type B are the reverse of type A in that outstandings
are dominated by extinguishments. The situation envisaged is that
in which offerings form a smooth series in relation to extinguish-
ments. In the limit = 0and == 1.If in addition
offerings and extinguishments are uncorrelated0), then p1..
=0.For markets of type B a series on extinguishments is an86 TECHNiCAL NOTE
efficient indicator of the net change in outstandings. Type B is not
often approximated in practice; but the behavior of certain con-
tractual savings schemes does approach it. Since the flow into the
stock of savings is regular while withdrawals are erratic, the net
change is dominated by withdrawals.
Markets of type C occupy an intermediate position between A and
B. Here, the variances of offerings and extinguishments are assumed
to be of approximately the same magnitude =1)and the
series are taken to be independent (P23 =0).Eqs. (1.6) then show
that=2022=2033,so that half of the variation in the net change
in outstandings is explained by offerings and half by extinguish-
ments. In addition, P12 = = 0.707,or== 1/2.For
markets of type C, prediction of the net change in outstandings by
either offerings or extinguishments separately would be only half
as efficient as prediction by the two simultaneously. Table 5 suggests
that the railroad bond market is roughly of type C.
Markets of type D are similar to those of type C in that the
variance of offerings is of about the same magnitude as the variance
of extinguishments (020/033= 1),and different in that the two
series are assumed to have high positive correlation (p23 =1).By
substitution in Eqs. (1.6) we find = 011/022 = P12—Pia=O•
Clearly the net change in outstandings is constant, so that both
offerings and extinguishments are independent of outstandings.
Table 5 shows that for the public utility sector of the bond market,
19004943, the series on total offerings and extinguishments behave
about that way: offerings and extinguishments are highly correlated
through refundings; both fluctuate over roughly the same range; and
both are virtually independent of the net change in outstandings.
That total offerings and total extinguishments of corporate bonds
are positively correlated has been shown in Table 5. To eliminate
refundings from each of the series, as will be done iii Chapter 3 to
obtain series on new-money offerings and repayments, breaks the
correlation and reveals an underlying market structure intermediate
between situations A and C. Table 14 (page 120) shows that new-
money offerings are correlated highly, though by no means perfectly,
with the net changes in outstandings and could therefore serve as a
rough indicator of the net change.
3. A Significance Test and a Confidence Region for the
Parameters Characterizing Market Structure
The parameters(022/033,p23)that completely determine market
structure are usually not known and must be estimated from sample
data. We are then confronted with the problem of testing whether
the information provided by the sample is consistent with the hypoth-
esis that the market has a given structure and of laying down a
confidence region for the population parameters.
An appropriate criterion for testing whether the market has aTECHNICAL NOTE 87
given structure can be constructed if we are willing to assume that
certain variates in the accounting identity, say X2 and X3, have an
appropriate probability distribution. In the present investigation of
corporate bond financing it has been assumed that the variates have




where theare elements of the population covariance matrixand
the cjjareelements of the inverse of this matrix. We wish to test a
hypothesis about (0-22/0-33,P23) subjectto the information provided
by S, the sample covariance matrix, under the assumption that Eq.





Werecall from section 1 that such a hypothesis is equivalent to the
hypothesis that all of the variance ratios, correlation coefficients, and







it is clear that the hypothesis (3.2) is equivalent to the hypothesis
that the population covariance matrixis specified up to an arbitrary
scale factor that is, thatis proportional to a given matrix.
The hypothesis (3.2) may therefore be expressed in the equivalent
form
(3.3) H0:
wherecispositive but otherwise unspecified andis the set of all
matrices having the properties(0-22/0-33)=(0-22/0-83) =
A likelihood ratio criterion to test the hypothesis (3.3) has been
developed by John W. Mauchly for the particular case in which
isthe identity matrix I; that is,in which =1, and
=0.3Mauchly's hypothesis may be expressed as
3JohnW. Mauchly, "Significance Test for Sphericity of a Normal
n-variate Distribution," The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, Vol. 11,
No. 2 (June 1940), pp. 204-209; also "A Significance-Test for Ellipticity
in the Harmonic Dial," Terrestrial Magnetism, Vol. 45 (1940), pp. 145-
48. The power of Mauchly's test criterion has been investigated by M. A.88 TECHNICAL NOTE
(3.4)
where c is positive but otherwise unspecified and I The
test criterion for the hypothesis (3.4) is
(3.5) 23
A2 + A3
where A2 and A3 are the two roots of the characteristic equation
(3.6) f(A)=IS—All=O
that is, the latent roots of S, where S is the sample covariance matrix
for X2 and X3. Mauchly's test is equivalent to a test that the ellipses
of constant probability density are circles (spheres in the n-dimen-
sional case).
From Eq. (3.6), we find
A2 + A3 =s22+ s33
A2 A3s22 s33 —
sothat Eq. (3.5) may be written in the form
2(822833 —p23)
(3.7) L +S33
Mauchlyhas determined the moments of the statistic L for the
spherical (n-dimensional) case and has derived the exact distribu-
tion for the circular (2-dimensional) case. For the 2-dimensional
case the moments reduce to
N—2 Mh(L)=N2+h







The distribution is unique since L is a bounded
Girshick, "The Distribution of the Ellipricity Statistic L when the
Hypothesis is False," Terrestrial Magnetism, Vol. 46, No.4 (1941), pp.
455-57.
Cf. Harald Cramer, Mathematical Methods ofStatistics(Princeton,
1946), p. 177.TECHNICAL NOTE 89




Inthe present analysis of the corporate bond market N =44,
=0.05,and we reject H0 when L =(0.05)h/42•
Mauchly'stest can be generalized to cover cases in which is
assumed not equal to I. Since isthe matrix of a positive definite
quadratic form there exists at least one real nonsingular linear
transformation on X2 and X3 that carriesover into the identity
matrix I. This transformation will carry S over into the matrix S.
For testing any particular hypothesis theprocedure would then
be as follows:
(1) find a matrix A such that A' is the trans-
pose of A;
(2) determine ASA' =S,the covariance matrix of the trans-
formed sample values; — —
(3)calculate the latent roots of S fromS —Al
I= 0,and
substitute in Eq. (3.5).
These calculations, while perfectly straightforward, can be avoided
once and for all by transforming L into an expression explicitly
involving the population variances and covariances. We note that
since there is at least one transformation that carries over into
the circular form (the form having matrix I), there must be an
infinite number of them, all similar except for the orientation of the
axial system. We can thus perform a second transformation, this
one orthogonal, that will carry S over into a form Si The latent roots
of S are unaffected by the second transformation, since they are
invariant under all orthogonal The problem is to
find the latent roots of S (or of S).
The latent roots can be found most easily by looking upon S as the
matrix of a quadratic form in the same variables as the quadratic
form whose matrix is SinceS andmay both be taken as
positive definite, there exists a real nonsingular linear transformation
carryingover into I and S into
A20where A2 and A3 are
0A3
the roots of the lambda-equation
(3.8)
and are clearly the desired latent roots of 5 (and S) •6Whenthe
latent roots are determined from Eq. (3.8) and substituted in Eq.
(3.5), L reduces to the form
2 (822833— s232 )(o-22cr33 — U23 )
(3.9) L= +u33829 —
Ibid., p. 113.
6MaximeBôcher, Introduction to Higher Algebra (New York, 1907),
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By substituting the appropriate values implied by(ff22/r33)=
(o22/g83)andP23= inEq. (39), we can test any hypothesis
of the type (3.3). The test criterion (3.9) reduces to (3.7) in
testing for circularity.
A second way of using the criterion (3.9), which proved con-
venient in the present study of corporate bonds, is to establish a 95
percent confidence region for o22/tr33andP23bysubstituting L* =
(0.05)1/42 forL in the equation and inserting the sample values for
82258335 and823.Aftersolving for this region (the region for
p23)' thecorresponding region forP12and isdetermined. The
confidence-region approach has an advantage over the testing of
specific hypothesis in that the confidence region includes all hypoth-
eses that would not be rejected on the basis of the sample data. In
the sections of the book that deal with accounting identities, all
statements about the significance of deviations of correlation coeffi-
cients from zero and of the variance ratio from unity are based on
whether or not the assumed values= 0and = 1fall
within the appropriate joint confidence region.